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I.

ABSTRACT

Many today claim that, after WWII, the fall of the Berlin wall and, now,
September 11, 2001, the changing nature of nation states, democracy,
and the law can no longer be sensibly ignored. How can comparative
law contribute to such an important debate? In what follows, it is argued
that one way to contribute to the debate over the changing nature of
nation states, democracy, and the law would be to engage in poetic
comparisons of law's many domains. What, then, are poetic comparisons
of law, and what do they invite us to do? Learning from Martin Heidegger' s
life-long advocacy of meditating thinking, poetic comparisons of law are
meditating comparisons. Neither poetry nor any such form of representational
thought, poetic comparisons of law encourage us to begin by thinking
legal thinking afresh and, in particular, by thinking again the long-forgotten
question of comparative law-what is comparative law? A radical answer
to such a question clearly shows how it is only by bringing language as
well as difference firmly at the center stage of comparative analysis that
we might be able ever again to conduct meaningful comparisons in
today's rapidly changing societies. Poetic comparisons of law, however,
take language and difference to mean something quite unlike their
ordinary, everyday meaning.
II.

INTRODUCTION

After millennia, not so much of humanism as of (Graeco-Latin and Jud~eoChristian) anthropocentrism a great schism is in preparation, and we are living
through the beginnings of it.)
[I]s it normal to build and construct? In fact, it is not, and
2 we should preserve
the absolutely problematical character of the undertaking.

A. Nation States, Democracy, and the Law
Can thought be thought afresh? Can law-this most fortunate, elaborate,
controversial artifact of human thinking-be thought afresh? Surely, these
are rather large and daunting questions to ask-yet questions which the
increasing displacement of the modern nation state and its laws demands
urgently to ask.3 As now Ground Zero seems to have dramatically replaced
the Brandenburg Gate as the symbolic place of a very real if wider process

1.
2.
TOWERS

PAUL VIRILIo, GROUND ZERO (Chris Turner trans., 2002).
JEAN BAUDRILLARD, THE SPIRIT OF TERRORISM AND REQUIEM FOR THE TWIN

(Chris Turner trans., 2002).
3. In what follows, I shall use indifferently the expressions "state" and "nation
state" to indicate what, in the relevant literature, is normally referred to as the modern
nation state or, as the U.S. State Department puts it, the "European state model".
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of reconfiguration of the "West", many understandably claim that, as a
consequence, nation states have now grown weaker than ever before,
and so the big question can no longer be sensibly postponed whether
there can be democracy without, or upon the decline of, the nation state. 4
For if states are, quite literally, loosing grounds, democracy need not
necessarily follow suit. Yet, at the same time, the uncertain evolution of
Western democracies cannot but reflect on Western conceptions of
law-and that is, by contrast, an issue which commentators are often
much more reluctant to consider or to tackle.. That is to say, one might
have to ask whether there can be law (in any modern-democratic sense
of that word) in what appear to be progressively stateless democracies"stateless" in the specific sense of being democracies where state
institutions play a considerably humbler role than ever before.5 If the
answer is yes, how so?6 If the answer is no, then why not? 7 Take the
matter of legislation and adjudication. Traditionally, legislation and
adjudication are jealously guarded national, regional and even local an
affair, and there is scope to think that, despite the appearances, this
might continue to be so even in the era of today's big, super-national,
law-giving agencies-such as, for example, the European Union. Often,
however, this latter point has been stretched to suggest that, contrary to
what the optimists believe, the modern nation state model continues to
go strong-and so, the rule of law, with which that model is normally

4. In recent years, a widening number of observers spell out such concern in diverse
if rather unequivocal terms. See JEAN-MARIE GUtHENNO, THE END OF THE NATION-STATE
(Victoria Elliot trans., University of Minnesota Press 1995) (1993); JEAN DE MAILLARD, UN
MONDE SANS Loi (1998); Stephen Gill, Toward a Postmodern Prince? The Battle of Seattle
as a Moment in the New Politics of Globalisation,29 MILLENNIUM-J. INT'L STUD. 131
(2000); MICHAEL HARDT & ANTONIO NEGRI, EMPIRE (2000); VIRILIO, supra note 1; Noam
Chomsky, 9-11 (2001); BAUDRILLARD, supra note 2; ALAIN JOXE, EMPIRE OF DISORDER

(Ames Hodges trans., Sylvdre Lotringer ed., Semiotest(e) 2002). The newly elected
Archbishop of Canterbury, Rowan Williams, showed similar concerns in his Dimbley
Lecture, delivered on December 19, 2002, and reported by the GUARDIAN, Dec. 20, 2002. I
thank Lupo for bringing this text to my attention.
5. So, then, by stateless democracies I do not here refer to anything like the
problems encountered in "stateless societies" as defined by early anthropological
investigations of jurisprudence. E.g., Paul Bohannan, The Differing Realms of the Law,
67/6 AM ANTHROPOLOGIST 33, 33-42 (1965).
6. Noticeable is, among others, the research conducted in recent years by Gunther
Teubner. See GUNTHER TEUBNER, LAW AS AN AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEM (Anne Bankowska
& Ruth Adler trans., Zenon Bankowski ed., 1993).
7. For one suggestive answer to the "why not" question see HARDT & NEGRI,
supra note 2.

associated, could not be revoked in doubt. 8 But, surely, neither can be
sensibly doubted that the nation states are no longer what they used to be
until the end of the Cold War. Nor, on the other hand, can one easily deny
how today states seem to be progressively giving-in to certain global and
not so accountable organizations or networks of organizations or trends
which appear to be rapidly eroding them "from within" 9-in this respect,
the case of Britain being, apparently, exemplary. 0 So, states are loosing
grounds and, if relatively stateless democracies (democracies where
states constitute just one of the many existing regulatory agencies) may
well represent our next best bet, the rule of law may too require some
entirely fresh thinking. The interests at stake, of course, are high-as,
for example, the recent crisis in Italy over article 18 of the Workers'
Chart (Statuto dei lavoratori), as well as over other just as dubious
governmental proposals to reform the judiciary, all too clearly demonstrates.
So, while tackling the long-established equation between democracy and
the modern nation state, we must today confront the parallel, thorny
problem of whether, in the twilight of the modern nation state, there can
nevertheless continue to be some sustainable form or degree of
democratic legality. This is one of the now increasingly obvious challenges
surrounding the matter of human rights, which seem to need states to be
fully enforced," but also one of the challenges lying before what has been
called the "Seattle movement" or the "movement of all movements"which purports to oppose war, neo-liberal capitalism and its global
strategies.' 2 No doubt, though, traditional structures so far supporting
and supported by the nation state model do, in this increasingly abstract
age, seem to be less and less capable of delivering on their traditional
promises.' 3 Thus, if national security, for example, has only now
revealed the depths of its paradoxes-the increasing difficulties which
Western democracies have for some time been experiencing to provide
8.

The skepticals are growing in number.

See Oliver Remien, Illusion und

Realitat eines europaischen Privatrechts,in JURISTENZEITUNG 47, 277-84 (1992); Tony

Weir, Die Sprachen des europaischen Rechts. Eine skeptische Betrachtung, in
ZEITSCHRIFT FOR EUROPAISCHES PRIVATRECHT 368, 368-74 (1995); Pierre Legrand,
European Legal Systems are not Converging, in INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 52, 52-81 (1996);
COSTAS DOUZINAS, THE END OF HUMAN RIGHTS: CRITICAL LEGAL THOUGHT AT THE

TURN OF THE CENTURY (2000).
9. DE MAILLARD, supra note 4.
10.

GEORGE MOMBIOT, THE CAPTIVE STATE:

THE CORPORATE TAKEOVER

OF

BRITAIN (2000).
11. Igor Stramignoni, Soggetto di diritto e diritti (fondamentali) del soggetto:
autonomia, linguaggio e diritto comparato, 20 Riv. CRIT. DIR. PRIv. 223-43 (2002).
12. See Gill, supra note 4.
13. On the increased expectations placed on modem legal systems see Lawrence
M. FRIEDMAN, Legal Cultures and the Welfare State, in DILEMMAS OF LAW IN THE
WELFARE STATE 13-27 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1986) (1985).
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for the old, or the ill, or the migrant are but a few of the more glaring
instances of what some may regard as a state of fast-approaching,
generalized "stand-still". On the other hand, Jean Baudrillard, for example,
reminds us in a recent essay of the "absolutely problematical character"
of building and constructing-a warning that could be read as applying
to legal constructions too.14 In the matter of national security, some rather
interesting studies are now being put forward; 15 but, what about the rule
of law?' Can law be thought of in a radically new way? Or should we
abandon that very central project of Western democracies altogether?
III. POETIC COMPARISONS
"The philosopher of the future is an artist and a physician-in one word, a
law-giver."17

A.

Intimations

Comparative law, or rather poetic comparisons of law's many domains,
may well be in a position convenient enough at least to begin to tackle
some of the questions raised by many current preoccupations concerning
democracy, nation states, and the law in today's highly abstract society.
Such larger questions can only be sensibly addressed step by step, rather
than at once-but in this paper we can at least begin by asking what
poetic comparisons of law might be. That is the principal question we
will be addressing in what follows, and the general response to the
question is that poetic comparisons of law are a clearing which starts by
thinking the question of comparative law-what is comparative law?entirely from scratch. Poetic comparisons, that is, are, in a fundamental
sense, meditating comparisons.18
However, it should be noted at the outset how poetic comparisons have
hardly anything to do with mainstream comparisons-at least in that
14.
15.

BAUDRILLARD, supra note 2, at 51.
See DIDIER BIGO, To Reassure, and Protect,After September 11, in PERSPECTIVES
FROM THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (SSRC); JOXE, supra note 4.
16. For a recent survey on some of the consequences of September II, 2001 on
matters of international law, humanitarian and human rights law, and narratives of war,
see LAW AFrER GROUND ZERO (John Stawson ed., The GlassHouse Press, The Cavendish
Publishing 2002).
17.

GILLES DELEUZE,

MILLE PLATEAUX.

CAPITALISME ET SCHIZOPHRENIE (Les

Editions de Minuit 1980) (translation is the author's).
18. Igor Stramignoni, The King's One Too Many Eyes: Language, Thought and
Comparative Law, UTAH L. REV. (forthcoming 2003).

they do not focus, like mainstream comparisons generally do, on function,
efficiency, or linear-historyto find broad, underlying commonalities among
the legal rules, institutions or procedures compared.1 9 On the other hand,
poetic comparisons are no poetry either-for they do think that, in today's
highly abstract society, ordinary language (speech, written word, etc.) can
no longer be, as "dissident" comparative lawyers seem by contrast to
suggest, the only promising inroad into a meaningful understanding of
law's many domains.2 ° Neither mainstream comparative law, nor poetry or
19. As here I am not interested to discuss in any detail the existing brands of
mainstream comparative law but, as we will see, merely to exhibit their common
instrumental nature, my own characterization of mainstream comparative law as
focusing on function, efficiency, or linear history can suffice. That said, traditional,
mainstream comparative law has long of course been keen to favor the functionalequivalence method popularized in the Anglo-American world by KONRAD ZWEIGERT
& HEIN KOTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW (Tony Weir trans., 2d rev. ed.
1997) (1992). The relevant literature is enormous and the effort here to reflect such
literature to any degree of completeness would be both pointless and doomed-but see
THE GRADUAL CONVERGENCE: FOREIGN IDEAS, FOREIGN INFLUENCES, AND ENGLISH
LAW OF THE EVE OF THE 21 ST CENTURY (B.S. Markesinis ed., 1994); MICHAEL JOACHIM
BONELL, AN INTERNATIONAL RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACT LAW-THE UNIDROIT
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS (Transnational Publishers,

Inc. 2nd ed. 1997); Mauro Bussani & Ugo Mattei, The Common Core Approach to
European Private Law, 3 COLUMBIA J. EUR. L. 339 (1996-97); Klaus Peter Berger,
Harmonization of European Contract Law: The Influence of Comparative Law, 50
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 877 (2001); Roy Goode, Insularity or Leadership? The Role of
the United Kingdom in the Harmonization of Commercial Law, 50 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 751 (2001). As mentioned, other popular brands of mainstream comparative law
focus by contrast on linear history or else on efficiency-e.g., Erich Genzmer, A Civil
Lawyer's Views on Comparative Legal History, 15 AM. J. COMP. L. 87, 87-100
(1967); REN DAVID & JOHN E. C. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD
TODAY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LAW (2d ed. 1978);
RUDOLF B. SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW: CASES-TEXT-MATERIALS (4th ed.
1980); ARTHUR TAYLOR VON MEHREN & JAMES RUSSELL GORDLEY, THE CIVIL LAW
SYSTEM (2d ed. 1977); Alan Watson, Comparative Law and Legal Change, 37
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 313, 313-36 (1978); Symposium, Change in the Common Law: Legal
and Economic Perspectives, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 189 (1980); ALAN WATSON, LEGAL
TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW (2d ed. 1993) (1974); Ugo
Mattei, Efficiency in Legal Transplants: An Essay in Comparative Law and
Economics, 14 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 3 (1994).
20. In my view, ordinary language cannot tell us the whole story. However,
focus on ordinary language can lead to extremely interesting insights-often
somewhat more interesting than those that follow to an analysis based on function,
efficiency, or linear history. For a sense of what dissident comparative lawyers are up
to (and without of course any pretence of completeness), see Duncan Kennedy, Form
and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976); Ginter
Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons: Re-thinking Comparative Law, 26 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 411 (1985); Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to
Comparative Law (Installment I of II), 39 AM. J. CoMP. L. 1 (1991); Rodolfo Sacco,
Legal Formants:A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law (2nd Installment), 39 AM.
J. COMP. L. 343 (1991) [hereinafter Sacco, Legal Formants]; Michael de S.-O.-I'E.
Lasser, Judicial (Self-) Portraits:Judicial Discourse in the French Legal System, 104
YALE L.J. 1325 (1995). Also noteworthy are the many diverse articles published by
the 1997 Utah Law Review, Symposium: New Approaches to Comparative Law-to
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any other form of representational thinking based on ordinary language,
poetic comparisons are, in Heidegger's own terms, "meditating thinking"not "calculating thinking".
The distinction between calculating thinking and meditating thinking
is a recurrent theme in Heidegger's existential analytic.2 1 For the
moment, suffice to say that through "calculating thinking" man always
attempts to measure out (rechnen) the circumstances in which he must
begin to act. Characteristic (but not exclusive) of scientific thinking,
calculating thinking is instrumental thinking-it always counts in
advance on the results it hopes to achieve. An estimate as much as an
actual measurement, calculating thinking is, so to speak, "restless"
thinking-one which is constantly out to calculate the world in some
new, more efficient, useful way. If, however, calculating thinking does
not meditate the meaning which dominates what there is, 22 "meditating
thinking" does. In particular, meditating thinking meditates what, at first,
will seem to have hardly any obvious, practical use-it meditates over
what, at first, will seem to be of no use if one is to achieve one particular
goal or another. For, Heidegger points out, the meaning of things is
indeed, strictly speaking, quite useless. Yet, the meaning of things is
also what is most necessary-for without meaning even what is useful
would be meaningless, and so would no longer be of any use. 23 So,
again, poetic comparisons of law's many domains are meditating
mention but a few, Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Akhnai, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 309-58
(1997); Brenda Cossman, Turning the Gaze Back on Itself: Comparative Law,
Feminist Legal Studies, and the Postcolonial Project, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 525-44
(1997); and, David Kennedy, New Approaches to Comparative Law: Comparativism
and International Governance, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 545-637 (1997).
21.
See, e.g., MARTIN HEIDEGGER, Nachwort, in WAS IST METAPHYSIK? (1980)
(Nachwort was initially placed at the beginning of WAS IST METAPHYSIK? (Klostermann,
Frankfurt a M., 5th ed. 1949) then published separately in WEGMARKEN (Klostermann,
Frankfurt a M., rev. and exp. ed. 1976) (1967)). See also MARTIN HEIDEGGER,
Gelassenheit (Memorial Address), in DISCOURSE ON THINKING (John M. Anderson and E.
Hans Freund trans., Harper & Row 1966) [hereinafter HEIDEGGER, Gelassenheit];
MARTIN HEIDEGGER, Zur Erorterung der Gelassenheit. Aus einem Feldweggespracht
uber das Denken, in Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens 1910-1976, in 13 GESAMTAUSGABE
37-74 (hrsg v. H. Heidegger, Klostermann, Frankfurt a M. 1983) [hereinafter
HEIDEGGER, 13 GESAMTAUSGABE]; MARTIN HEIDEGGER, UBERLIEFERTE SPRACHE UND
TECHNISCHE SPRACHE (1989) [hereinafter HEIDEGGER, UBERLIEFERTE SPRACHE].
22. HEIDEGGER, Gelassenheit, supra note 21.
23. HEIDEGGER, UBERLIEFERTE SPRACHE, supra note 21. On this posthumous text
see Hans-Helmuth Gander, Wege der Seinsfrage. Aus Anlaf3 der 100. Wiederkehr des
GesburtstagesMartin Heideggers veroffentlichte Texte aus dem Nachla3, 6 HEIDEGGER
STUDIES 117, 117-29 (1990).

In
thinking-meditating comparisons-not calculating thinking.
shortly
see,
particular, they are meditating thinking in that, 24as we will
they seek to think what difference the law makes.
But what difference does the law make?. And does the law make any
difference? In spite of the appearances, there is no short, self-evident
answer to such simple questions-so it may be worth to start by looking
more in depth at the difference between calculating and meditating thinking.
To do so, let us turn to one of Heidegger's least known contributions to the
question of Being-a short exercise entitled The Candlestick (Der
Leuchter) and printed for private circulation in 1941-which suggests an
unorthodox yet promising point of departure for our inquiry:
Shine-forth Light
Of the Golden Candle,
Blaze
This Darkened Space.
Carry your Light Candlestick
Over Early Sufferings
And Curse
Figures and Monies.
Light and Candlestick
One by the Other...
From There Be Born
25
A Silent World.

Some might be tempted to treat The Candlestick as a piece of poetry
and, in particular, to see reflected in it the discomfort Heidegger had
come to feel in relation to his upbringing as a Roman Catholic, his
humble social status and his frequent financial difficulties.26 Rather
more interesting however is, in fact, the place of The Candlestick. The piece
is included in a collection of similar exercises entitled Intimations
(Winke). 27 In the Afterword of Intimations, Heidegger explains how (contrary
to what one might expect) such exercises should be treated as neither
poetic compositions (Dichtungen) nor, on the other hand, some sort of
philosophy in verse. 28 Instead, they should be considered an instance of
poetic thinking-intimations of a thinking which, because it can never be
fully expressed by the language which must say it, can and should never
24.
25.

See discussion infra Part V.A. See Stramignoni, supra note 18.
"Der Leuchter-Leuchte Licht/der Goldnen Kerze,/uberflamme/braunes Feld./Lichte

Leuchter/friihe Schmerze/und verdamme/Zahl und Geld./Licht und Leuchter/Herz bei
Herze.. ./Dem entstamme/Stille bWelt." Translation by the author together with Lupo.
26.

RODIGER SAFRANSKI, MARTIN HEIDEGGER-BETWEEN GOOD AND EVIL (Ewald

Osers trans., 1998).
Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens 1910-1976, in 13
27. HEIDEGGER,
GESAMTAUSGABE, supra note 21, at 23-33.
28. For a useful, recent discussion on this see FLAVIO CASSINARI, IL PENSIERO
POETANTE-LA PRODUZIONE LIRICA HEIDEGGERIANA (1910-1975) (Mimesis 2000).
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be taken thus to have been properly exhausted. As such, Heidegger warns,
poetic thinking should never be treated as mere calculating thinking.
Neither mere poetry nor mere philosophy-poetic thinking is, by contrast,
meditating thinking. Neither poetry nor philosophy, poetic thinking is, for
Heidegger, up-coming thinking (kiinftiges Denken)-simply and yet
crucially an intimation of the thinking to come.29
B.

Thresholds

There are here two main points which Heidegger makes in
Intimations and from which we can learn in view of our investigation
into poetic comparisons of law's many domains. The first point is that
the relationship between poetic, meditating thinking and (on the other
hand) poetry, philosophy, or any other calculating, instrumental
thinking, must be fundamentally reinvented-in the original sense of
having to be discovered again (inventio). So, then, the relationship between
poetic, meditating thinking and Western legal thinking must too be
reinvented-for, just like poetry and philosophy, Western legal thinking
is calculating, instrumental thinking. The second point is that the
relationship between poetic, meditating thinking and what Western
metaphysics have traditionally called "Being" must be thought afresh
just as well. To be sure, poetic, meditating thinking is the thinking of
Being. 30 But can we think such relationship afresh-beyond, that is, the
smoky screen built, throughout much of the history of Western thinking,
by what has developed into merely calculating, instrumental thinking?
Consider again The Candlestick. Light and Candlestick, "one by the
other", are bound in a way which, on first examination, is neither causal
nor formal. Yet, there can be hardly any doubt that they are bound all the
same. So, there must be some relationship between them-much like
the relationship between thinking and Being-and, yet, such relationship
must be, again, neither causal nor formal. 3' Here, Western philosophical
thinking can be of little help-for, again, Western philosophical thinking
has long developed into mere calculating thinking. Poetic thinking, by
contrast, promises (in the sense purported by Heidegger) to be meditating
29.

In the text, the English quotations of Brief iiber den Humanismus are taken

from MARTIN HEIDEGGER, Letter on Humanism, in BASIC WRITINGS 217-65 (David

Farrell Krell rev. and exp. ed. 2000).
30.

See discussion infra Parts IV.A., V.A.-B.

31.

On the relationship between meditating thinking and Being, see discussion

infra Part IV.A.

thinking, that is "other-thinking". Importantly, other-thinking is not only
no out-and-out thinking (thinking as thinking is commonly understood to
be, thus calculating, instrumental thinking) but also no other-thanthinking. Instead, other-thinking is thinking which is radically othermore precisely, one which is other than the "frantic measuring and
calculating" of today's philosophical (or other) calculating thinking.32
But that is not all. Indeed, not only Heidegger's poetic thinking is no
mere philosophical thinking but there is no mere poetry (no mere
representational thinking) either-in so far that poetic, meditating
thinking (unlike poetry itself) is in fact image-less (bildlos). The point
of poetic thinking, for example, would be neither to construct metaphors
nor to lay out descriptions-considering that, in the end, metaphors and
descriptions must be representations and, so, thinking which is merely
(re)presented in a different way. One may well, of course, encounter
suggestive images on the way-one, for example, may well encounter
suggestive images in Intimations which could be considered "poetic" in
the usual sense of that word-but that is not what poetic thinking as
meditating thinking is primarily about. The Candlestick, it would seem,
is not about a particular, imagined, Heideggerian "silent world" (and, to
the extent that it is, it does not greatly matter)-while, at the same time,
it does, no doubt, set a world of silence on its way. In that sense,
Heidegger's poetic thinking (whether in Intimations or elsewhere) is
image-less, for no image or group of images can adequately encompass
it. So, it is not, like some would mistakenly have it, image-less in the
rather different sense of there not being images in it, which can and must
evoke it. Quite the opposite, such thinking is indeed characterized, if at
all, by an excess of images rather than a lack thereof.
The point, here, is that seldom are images simple images-instead,
normally they are thresholds. And so are words (concepts). It is thus,
then, that in Heidegger's Intimations words and images hang at the
threshold between calculating thinking and other-thinking (poetic,
meditating thinking)-neither here nor there and yet closer to both than,
at first, one might realize. So, in The Candlestick, the third stanzawhile drawing as it should the "poem" to a close-suddenly starts the
first two stanzas as well as the third one on their way. The third stanza,
in other words, is, in fact, an opening, a threshold-not a closing. In
Deleuzian terms, the third stanza is a threshold in that it marks not so
much a limit beyond which one cannot go-as, rather more dramatically,
a point of no return.3 3
32.
MARTIN HEIDEGGER, "...Poetically Man Dwells...",
THOUGHT 213-29 (Albert Hofstradter trans., 1975) (1971).
33. See DELEUZE, supra note 17.

in POETRY, LANGUAGE,
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Light and Candlestick
One by the Other...
From There Be Born
A Silent World.

Thus, in The Candlestick, the images and words of a "silent world"
radiate into the world of silence which has originated it and which it
has, recursively, contributed to originate. We must absolutely try to
visualize this. Indeed, what is interesting about it (especially for the
comparative lawyer) is precisely how there lies the foundational
paradox, the illuminating difficulty of language which, through the
endless and endlessly creative play of analogies and differences, may
well turn out to be, each time, as much calculating, instrumental
thinking-as other-thinking.34
IV. THE LANGUAGE OF COMPARISONS
In every point of this city you can, in turn, sleep, make tools, cook, accumulate
gold, disrobe, reign, sell, question oracles. The traveler roams all around and
has nothing but doubts: he is unable to distinguish the features of the city, the
features he keeps distinct in his mind also mingles. He infers this: if existence
in all its moments is all of itself, Zoe is the place of indivisible existence. But
why, then, does the city exist? What line separates the35inside from the outside,
the rumble of the wheels from the howls of the wolves?
A. The Paradoxof Language

As an instance of meditating thinking, Heidegger's poetic thinking in
The Candlestick exhibits to a considerable extent the foundational
paradox of language. Indeed, the paradox of language was precisely
what Heidegger must have alluded to when, in a conference held on
December 7, 1950 in Btihlerhile and entitled Language (Die Sprache)
he announced how "[1]anguage is language", and how "language speaks". 36
At first, those might seem rather odd assertions to make. Yet, they ring
true right away. So, what does it mean to say that language is language
34. HEIDEGGER, Das Wort (The Word), in Unterwegs zur Sprache (Pfullingen,
Neske 1959), in 12 GESAMTAUSGABE 25 (hrsg. V F-W von Hermann, Klostermann,
Frankfurt a M 1985).
35.
36.

ITALO CALVINO, INVISIBLE CITIES (William Weaver, trans., 1974) (1972).
The conference was repeated on February 14, 1951 in Stuttgart. See HEIDEGGER,

Die Sprache (Language), in Unterwegs zur Sprache,in 12 GESAMTAUSGABE, supra note 34, at
229. In the text, the English quotations of Die Sprache are taken from HEIDEGGER,
Language, in POETRY, LANGUAGE, THOUGHT, supra note 32, at 189-210.

and that language speaks? Such seemingly confusing propositions must
be taken seriously if one is to grasp the potential significance of poetic
comparisons of law as a way towards a fresh understanding of the fragile
links which bind democracy, the nation state, and law in today's
increasingly abstract society. They must be taken seriously if, in other
words, one is to grasp which must be today the language of comparisons.
Language, Heidegger explained, is neither mere "expression", nor simply
an "activity of man", nor is it only "presentation and representation of
the real and the unreal". 37 In short, language is not only out-and-out,
calculating thinking (speech, for instance), but also something else-it is
also other-thinking. 38 Is it, though, only other-thinking? Not at all. Indeed,
no one would dare to declare incorrect, let alone reject as useless, the
identification of language as audible utterance of inner emotions, as human
activity, as a representation by image and concept. The view of language thus
put forth is correct, for it conforms to what an investigation of linguistic
phenomena can make out in them at any time. And all questions associated
with the description and explanation
of linguistic phenomena also move within
39
the precincts of this correctness.

But if language is both thinking (calculating thinking) and otherthinking, then, we suggest, language is a threshold, at the threshold of
both. At the threshold of thinking, language is that which can not
(yet) be spoken to the full. It is "up-coming thinking". At the threshold
of other-thinking, language is, by contrast, speech "kept safe in what
is spoken"-though "often, and too often, we encounter what is
spoken only as the residue of a speaking long lost". 40 One, of course,
should be weary of treating the threshold of language as a linear,
quasi-chronological mark between an inside and an outside or
between a prius and a posterius-or,for that matter, one between the
included and the excluded. Rather, we would suggest, language is a
threshold in the sense that language is "in-between"-at the same
time in thinking (in speech, for example) and between thinking and
other-thinking (up-coming thinking). In-between thinking and otherthinking, language is language and, at the same time, language
speaks. Language, that is, not man. 41
Furthermore, Heidegger goes on to explain, the threshold of language,
the threshold which language is, is a naming and naming is a calling.
37.
38.
39.

See HEIDEGGER, Language, supra note 36, at 192.
Language is not, however, other-than-thinking. See discussion infra Part II.B.
See Language, supra note 36, at 193.

40.

See HEIDEGGER, Language, supra note 36, at 194.

41. "Language speaks. This means at the same time and before all else: language
speaks. Language? And not man?... Are we, in addition to everything else, also going
to deny now that man is the being who speaks? Not at all." HEIDEGGER, Language,
supra note 36, at 198. See also Stramignoni, supra note 18.
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"The calling here calls into a nearness. But even so the call does not
wrest what it calls away from the remoteness, in which it is kept by the
calling there. The calling calls into itself and therefore always here and
there-here into presence, there into absence., 4 2
Thus naming-the naming of language-is a calling which need not
necessarily be followed by any material motion-while still being an action
of sort, a movement, a gesture. Such calling "calls into itself and therefore
always here and there-here into presence, there into absence". What
did Heidegger mean by that? Which is the place of the calling by
language? "The place of arrival which is also called in the calling is a
presence sheltered in absence., 43 Hence, again, the paradox of language.
Indeed, the calling of language calls into a presence which can only be
within an absence. Neither present nor absent, what is present can only,
continuously refer back to the absence which, recursively, originates it.
That is why such calling is an invitation-it has nothing to do, we might
add, with traditional instructions, orders or requests (which, sometimes
foolishly, attempt to direct one somewhere and, on the other hand, can
always be defied). Rather, such calling "invites things in, so that they
may bear upon man as things." 44 Neither instruction, order or request,
such an invitation is, however, still crucial, still original-as, for man,
such things can only be things upon such naming, which is a calling and
an invitation. And it is only thus that things can carry out the world. "In
the naming, the things named are called into their thinging. Thinging,
they unfold world, in which things abide and so are the abiding ones. By
thinging, things carry out world. 45
Thus, the multiple paradox of language-language is language and
language speaks, language is both thinking and other-thinking, language is a
calling whereby each presence is "sheltered in absence"-that multiple
paradox turns out to be language's innermost originality. Language, Heidegger
reminds us, is quintessentially original-in the very sense that, each time, it is
both the center (fons et origo) and the threshold of thinking. Language, we
might add, is what Italo Calvino called Zoe--"the place of indivisible
existence."'46 True horizon of life-language gives life to that horizon. True
horizon of a "silent world"--language gives life to a world of silence.
42.

See HEIDEGGER, Language, supra note 36, at 199.

43.

Id. at 199.

44.

Id.

45.

Id. at 199-200.
CALVINO, supra note 35, at 34.

46.

Light and Candlestick
One by the Other...
May stem from There
A Silent World.

Poetic comparisons of law's many domains thus invite us to
appreciate that such is the language of law-that such is, indeed, the
language of comparisons.
B.

Language "InterAlia"

Neither mainstream comparisons (concerned as they normally are with
function, linear-history, or efficiency) nor out-and-out poetry or out-andout philosophy, poetic comparisons of law are meditating thinking, not
calculating thinking. Poetic comparisons, no doubt, compare law's many
domains-law's people, law's words, and law's currency (by law's
"currency" I mean whichever needs the law may from time to time
represent)-but, then, the point is: how precisely do they do that? They
do that by going back to the meaning of what there is to compare and,
from there, to the paradox of language-thus clearing a place in which
new concerns may appear and old problems can be reformulated. Poetic
comparisons, in short, are a clearing. They are a clearing in that they
recognize how language is original and how the originality of language
lies in that, counterfactual as that might initially seem to be, language is
a center as well as a threshold. In particular, poetic comparisons think,
with Heidegger, that language is language, and that language speaks.
They think that language is thinking as well as other-thinking. And they
think that language is calling. Both a locus and a (non-linear) mark,
language is, for poetic comparisons, "in-between"-and so it lies, quite
literally, inter alia.
But what does it mean to be lying inter alia? Heidegger does not
discuss this in so many words but, we suggest, lying inter alia is a lying
which occurs both here and now, as well as elsewhere and else-when.
Lying inter alia, that is, is neither a lying which is only a lying-the
solitary, oblivious, individual lying of mute matter-nor, on the other
hand, lying inter alia is only a lying-together, a symbolic lying
designating a unity, or a community, through which this lying only, that
is wholly, belongs and without which it cannot properly exist. Lying
inter alia is, in fact, none of that. Instead, lying inter alia is both a
lying-in and a lying-in-between-or, which is the same, both a now-lying
and a then-lying. If that is so, if that is what lying inter alia is about,
then language lies inter alia in the precise sense that, each time,
language lies both here or there and now or then-as well as lying, at the
same time, elsewhere and else-when (inter alia). Importantly, moreover,
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language, on lying inter alia, lies in-between law too-each time, it lies
both in law and in-between law and other-law (other-thinking), both here
and now as well as elsewhere and else-when. Lying inter alia, that is,
language lies, each time, both at the center and at the threshold of law
(as well as elsewhere and else-when).
How so? How does language lie in-between law as well as, generally,
inter alia? As calculating thinking, language (ordinary language, one
might say) lies each time at the center, that is at the origin, of law-that
is, language as calculating thinking always is law itself (out-and-out law,
law as law). As other-thinking, on the other hand, language lies each
time at the threshold of law, at the threshold that is with other-law
(which, accordingly, is neither out-and-out law nor, simply, other-thanlaw). Conversely, law as calculating thinking (law as law) lies each time
at the center of language-and so, in that respect, law is language itself
(ordinary language). By contrast, law as other-thinking lies at the
threshold of (ordinary) language-a threshold which is both extended
and complex, yet away from its center. But if each time language lies
both at the center and at the threshold of law-and if each time law lies
both at the center and. the threshold of language-then, so poetic
comparisons suggest, law can never be just calculating thinking (it can
never be just ordinary language). Instead, law must be always, also,
other-thinking, that is meditating, up-coming thinking. In-between
calculating thinking and other-thinking, law (like language) lies, each
time, inter alia. That is of some importance for poetic comparisons of
law's many domains-for it shows how law as law (legal rules, legal
procedures, legal concepts etc) must contain, in itself, the possibility of
other-law, of law radically other (without necessarily being something
other-than-law). In-between law and other-than-law, poetic comparisons
suggest, there is always the possibility of other-law, law which is neither
out-and-out law, nor something totally other than law. Furthermore, it is
precisely because mainstream comparisons tend to ignore that possibility
that, when they compare many traditional concepts like, for example, legal
causation, adjudication, and legislation, they seem to be hardly capable
of saying very much-rather, they sound technical, distant, even indifferent. For example, they take legal rules, institutions, or procedures
to "converge" but, on the other hand, seldom they succeed to draw
anything or anyone very much closer.47

47.

See generally Stramignoni, supra note 18.

So language lies inter alia. And so does law. Poetic, meditating
comparisons of law, then, recognize how the multiple paradox of
language invites us to think of language as "the house of Being" as well
as being the "home" in which "man dwells". 48 What, we suggest, that
really means is that language is the house which language continually,
recursively lays-out for man-and man is at home with language. That
is why central to the paradox of language (and central, perhaps, to
Heidegger's own thinking) is how "Being remains mysterious, the simple
nearness of an unobtrusive governance. The nearness occurs essentially
'49
as language itself. But language is not mere speech.
Thus, what Heidegger really appears to think by saying that language
is the "house of Being" and that man is at home with language is that,
again, language is inter alia. That is, language-is (language)-but, also,
language is-in-between (in-between language and other-language, inbetween thinking and other-thinking, etc). As such, "[l]anguage ...is
the relation of all relations. 5 ° We shall get back to this point throughout
the rest of this paper. Meanwhile, one might ask-what, then, is law?
The question, of course, is both ancient and daunting but, perhaps, one
could begin to approach the question afresh by considering how-both
thinking and other-thinking-law (like language) is inter alia. What,
precisely, does it mean to say that law is inter alia? Quite simply, such
proposition means that law-is (law). But to say that law is inter alia also
clarifies how, at the same time, law is-in-between (in-between law and
other-law, in-between thinking and other-thinking, in-between language
and other-language). Thus, lying (like language) inter alia-law is, in
some eminent sense, the house which law continually lays-out for man.
And man is at home with law.
C. Pointing
If poetic comparisons of law recognize that law, like language, lies
"in-between"-which is the language of law, which is the language that
poetic comparisons understand to be lying in-between law and otherlaw? Which is, in short, the language of comparisons? Such question
must be asked, if only as a starting point for further thoughts, for what
we said before-when, with Heidegger, we said that language is

48.
HEIDEGGER, Letter on Humanism, in BASIC WRITINGS, supra note 29, at 217;
Stramignoni, supra note 18.
49. HEIDEGGER, Letter on Humanism, in BASIC WRITINGS, supra note 29, at 236.
50. HEIDEGGER, Das Wesen der Sprache (The Nature of Language), in Unterwegs
zur Sprache, in 12 GESAMTAUSGABE, supra note 34. In the text, the English quotations

of Das Wesen der Sprache are taken from HEIDEGGER, ON THE WAY TO LANGUAGE

(Peter D.Hertz trans., Harper & Row 1971).
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language, language speaks, language is thinking as well as other
thinking, and language is calling-all that may have clarified in what
way language is in-between but it has not yet told us which language
might be the language in question. On the other hand, the language of
comparisons which concerns us here is not so much the language (or
languages) which poetic comparisons might or might not employrather, it is the language of the clearing in which poetic comparisons
occur as a clearing. So, which is the language of poetic comparisons?
Before an answer to this question can emerge, let us look at another of
Heidegger's important essays, initially prepared for a series of
conferences organized in 1959 by the Bayerische Akademie der Schben
Kiinste and by the Akademie der Kiinste in Berlin, and entitled The Way
to Language (Der Weg zur Sprache).5' In the essay, Heidegger begins
with recalling a long-standing tradition moving from Aristotle to the
Stoa to Wilhelm von Humboldt all equating language to "speech"-but,
then, turning (from the Hellenistic period onwards) away from sign
understood as a showing towards sign understood as a designating. Yet,
Heidegger adds, that is somewhat unsatisfactory for it does hide from
sight what language actually is, "it does not show the way in which
language essentially unfolds as language ...the way it remains gathered
in what it grants itself on its own as language. '2 Instead, what is needed
is "to bring language as language to language"-that is, to get "closer to
what is peculiar to language. 5 3 But how to do so-how can we bring
language as language to language? No doubt, a starting point is to realize
how "speech belongs to the speakers, but not as cause to effect. Rather,
in speech the speakers have their presencing. Where to? Presencing to
the wherewithal of their speech, to that by which
54 they linger, that which
in any given situation already matters to them."
In other words, the relationship between the speakers and their speech
cannot be understood as a mere causal relationship. It cannot, in
particular, be properly designated by the sequence thought-sound-voice.
That long-standing Western tradition would be indeed misleading. On
the other hand, while in language a number of elements and relations are
51. HEIDEGGER, Der Weg zur Sprache (The Way to Language), in Unterwegs zur
Sprache, in 12 GESAMTAUSGABE, supra note 34. In the text, the English quotations of
Der Weg zur Sprache are taken from HEIDEGGER, The Way to Language, in BASIC
WRITINGS,

52.
53.
54.

supra note 29, at 393-426.

HEIDEGGER,

Id. at 406.
Id.

The Way to Language, in

BASIC WRITINGS,

supra note 29, at 405.

clearly in question, so 'far Western thinking has been content, each time,
merely to enumerate such elements and relationships. Yet, "counting is
a recounting. It previews the unifying power in cohesion, but cannot yet
bring it to the fore., 55 Thus, the unifying unity of language has hitherto
remained nameless. Not even "language" would do-for what, each
time, is done under such rubric is merely to name such unity, each time,
in one or another respect. That is, what is done is, each time, to name
"language" only in this or that other mode of language.
So, Heidegger calls such so far name-less unity of language "riftdesign" (Der Aufriss). The rift-design, he explains, is "the drawing of
the essence of language, the well-joined structure of a showing in
which what is addressed enjoins
,,56 the speakers and their speech, enjoins
the spoken and its unspoken.
Revolving as they do around such
name-less unity, speech and what is spoken remain, however,
insufficiently thought of. No doubt, of course, "speech" and "what is
spoken" designate what comes forward whenever something is saidbut, Heidegger warns, saying is something other than speaking and, so,
one must ask what, in fact, is that which we call saying.
Saying is, for Heidegger, a showing, a letting something appear, a
letting it be seen and heard-and to speak is a saying something to one
another.5 7 So, then,
what pervades the rift-design in the essence of language is a richly configured
saying, from various provenances. With a view to the concatenations of saying,
we shall call the essence of language as a whole the saying [die Sage]. Even so,
we have to admit that the unifying element in these concatenations is not yet in
sight ... . What unfolds essentially in language is saying as pointing. Its showing
does not culminate in a system of signs. Rather, all signs58arise from a showing
in whose realm and for whose purposes they can be signs.

Thus, neither mere saying nor mere speech, language is the sayingmore precisely, saying as pointing. Neither merely human nor, of
course, inhuman or supernatural, 59 such pointing is, as a self-showing
(an appearing), characteristic "of every manner and degree of thing
present"-while, as human-showing, it is, each time, still preceded "by a
thing's letting itself be shown." 60 That is why the sequence thought55.
56.

Id. at 407.
Id. at 408.

57. So, too, "[t]he unspoken is not merely what is deprived of sound; rather, it is
unsaid, what is not yet shown, what has not yet appeared on the scene. Whatever has to
remain unspoken will be held in reserve in the unsaid." Id. at 409.
58. Id. at 409-10 (emphasis is Heidegger's).
59. "Speech is, of course, the creation of sounds. It can also be taken as an activity
of human beings. Both are correct representations of language as speech." Id. at 408.
On what, for Heidegger, counts as "human" see HEIDEGGER, Letter on Humanism, in
BASIC WRITINGS, supra note 29, at 217-65.
60. HEIDEGGER, The Way to Language, in BASIC WRITINGS, supra note 29, at 410.
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sound-voice on which Western thought has so far articulated its concept
of speech should be carefully reconsidered. Speech, Heidegger goes on
to suggest, is indeed all that-but it is also, at the same time, a hearing.
Speech, taken on its own, is hearing. It is listening to the language we speak.
Hence speaking is not simultaneously a hearing, but is such in advance ...We not
only speak language, we speakfrom out of it. We are capable of doing so only
because in each case we have already
61 listened to language. What do we hear
there? We hear language speaking.

Thus, language is the saying (Die Sage), the saying is a pointing
("language speaks by saying; that is, by showing"), and speech is a
hearing (or, a hearing in advance)-in the precise sense that upon
hearing "we find ourselves caught up in a hearing that lets itself be
62
told, a hearing that embraces all apprehending and representing.
That is, we would add, how poetic comparisons of law, which are a
clearing, think of language. They think of language not the way
language is commonly thought of by calculating thinking.6 3 Instead,
they think of language as a pointing-while, on the other hand,
thinking of speech (the old sequence thought-sound-voice) as a
hearing. If law must be thought afresh, and if poetic comparisons of
law are to help in such an enterprise, then language, so poetic
comparisons suggest, might need to be thought again-the language of
comparisons. The language of comparisons-the language of the
clearing in which comparisons occur as a clearing-would thus be not,
or not merely, ordinary language. 64 Instead, there is language inter
alia-that is, both a pointing and a hearing. Both a pointing and a
hearing, the language of comparisons is, thus, both thinking and otherthinking, both law and other-law.65
61.
62.

Id. at 411 (emphasis is Heidegger's).
Id. See also HEIDEGGER, UBERLIEFERTE SPRACHE, supra note 21.

63. There are many suggestive works on language understood in a broader sense
than simply as ordinary language-e.g., J. M. Lotman & B. Uspenskij, MIF-IMJAKUL'TURA, in TRUDY PO ZANKOVYM SISTEMAM 282-303

(Tartu,

1973); MICHEL

FOUCAULT, SURVEILLER ET PUNIR. NAISSANCE DE LA PRISON (Gallimard 1975); PETER
GOODRICH, LANGUAGES OF LAW-FROM LOGICS OF MEMORY TO NOMADIC MASKS
(1990); GIORGIO AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER: SOVEREIGN POWER AND BARE LIFE (Daniel
Heller-Roazen trans., Giulio Einaudi ed., 1995); CARLO GINZBURG, WOODEN EYES: NINE

REFLECTIONS ON DISTANCE (Martin Ryle & Kate Soper trans., 2001) (1998).

64.

But see Geoffrey Samuel, Comparative Law and Jurisprudence,47 INTL &

COMP. L.Q. 817 (1998).

65. We may now leave The Way to Language. Heidegger, however, goes on to
discuss the difficult matters of owning (Eignen), the appropriating (Ereignen), and
propriation (Ereignis)-theanalysis of which can be, for present purposes, safely postponed.

V.

MEDITATING COMPARISONS

[Tihis thing that is called difference, we encounter it everywhere and always in
the matter of thinking ... Our thinking is free either to pass over the difference
without a thought or to 66think of it specifically as such. But this freedom does
not apply in every case.

A.

Thinkers and Poets, and the ComparatistPoet

In an increasingly abstract age such as the one which we are experiencing
today, comparative lawyers must engage in poetic, meditating comparisons.
Learning from Heidegger, what is here meant by that is that comparative
lawyers must think again the fundamental concepts of comparative law
so as to clear the way from a thinking which is merely a calculating
thinking. Such clearing-meditating is not so much a re-thinking-literally, a
re-presentation, yet another presentation of what there already is. Instead,
such clearing-meditating is also, and more originally, a meditating
thinking-an absolute thinking, a thinking freed as much as possible from
the fetters of calculating thinking (absolutum) while, at the same time, being
as it must in relation to it. Legal comparisons must be meditating
comparisons-in the specific sense that they must meditate afresh what
they have long become accustomed to compare and so now tend to take
for granted. In particular, legal comparisons as meditating comparisons
must ask (or must ask again) what is comparative law. 67 That, we
suggest, is the urgent question of comparative law-the question which
comparative law must confront if it is sensibly to address the serious
issues which today concern Western democracies and the rule of law.
So, legal comparisons can no longer content themselves to be
traditional comparisons, that is calculating comparisons. Instead, they
must be meditating comparisons. But, then, what is it, precisely, that
legal comparisons must meditate? Surely, legal comparisons must
meditate the meaning of what, at first, may seem to be the simplest
aspects of comparisons. So, to begin with, the question of comparative
law, the question which comparative law must address if it is to tackle
satisfactorily the new challenges set by today's more abstract world,
requires us to ask, first of all, which is the language laying at the heart of
comparative law. Which, one must ask, is the language to which
comparative law must urgently pay attention?
In the preceding pages we have offered some preliminary indications
as to which might be one possible result of the inquiry concerning
language. Such indications are far from being complete and much more
66. MARTIN HEIDEGGER, IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE 63 (Jean Stambaugh trans.,
Harper Torchbooks 2002).
67. On the need to ask such question see Stramignoni, supra note 18.
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would need to be said. Furthermore, many other similar inquiries should
be made as well. In each case, each resulting prospect would go some
way towards a fuller reconsideration of the more fundamental question
investigating what a radically different comparative law might look like.
But before getting any closer to the question of comparative law, let us
briefly turn one last time to language. For at the threshold of language,
neither within nor without language (as language is, as we have seen,
inter alia) there are thinkers and poets, and their meditating thinking.
Just as, for Heidegger, meditating thinking is neither mere philosophy
nor mere poetry nor any other form of useful if somewhat crude
calculating thinking-so, too, Heidegger's thinkers and poets are neither
orthodox philosophers nor orthodox poets. Instead, they are "those who
think and those who create with words." 68 To think with words and to
create with words is, in both cases, meditating thinking. That is why
Heidegger's thinkers and poets are "guardians of language"-the guardians
of the house of Being in which man dwells. As guardians of language,
Heidegger's thinkers and poets are neither the high priests of language,
nor its oracles or prophets. Instead, they are just that-those who guard
language. Indeed, and more simply, "It]heir guardianship accomplishes
the manifestation of Being insofar as they bring the manifestation of
language and maintain it in language through their speech." 69
Heidegger' s thinkers and poets are guardians of language-and so, we
suggest, are comparatist poets. It is precisely thus that comparatist poets
understand in what way language can be law as well as language and,
similarly, how law can be language as well as law. But, if law and language
might well be found to rest on one another's gaze, then comparatist
poets must, each time, guard the law at the same time as they guard
language. And, similarly, they must guard language at the same time as
they guard the law.
So, then, comparatist poets are guardians of law as well as guardians
of language. By no means, of course, comparatist poets are the sole
guardians of law. Nor, we have seen, are comparatist poets anything
like law's high priests, oracles or prophets. Instead, we suggested,
comparatist poets are there, at the threshold of law, simply to guard the
law. They guard the law for they are thinkers and poets. And their
guardianship too, like that of Heidegger's thinkers and poets,

68.

HEIDEGGER,

69.

Id.

Letter on Humanism, in

BASIC WRITINGS, supra

note 29.

accomplishes the manifestation of Being insofar as they seek to bring the
manifestation of law (that is, of language) and maintain it in law (that is,
in language) through their speech.
At the threshold of law, as well as of language, neither within nor
without the law, neither "imprisoned" by language (as some would have
it) nor wholly free from it, comparatist poets are there to guard the law
(or, for that matter, to guard language). But what precisely does it mean
to say that comparatist poets guard the law? The English verb guard
derives from the noun ward (Old English weard, corresponding to
Middle Low German warde, Old High German warta) in the sense of
"watch" (normal development of West Germanic ward5, formed on ward-,
extension of war- "be on guard", "watch"). In its most original sense,
then, guarding something or somebody is not so much a protecting, a
fending off-as is, first of all, a watching, a watching with care. 70 But
what does it mean to be "watching with care"? To be watching with care is
to be looking at something or somebody thoroughly, comprehensively,
to be looking at that something or somebody in their own terms. To be
watching with care is, in particular, to be aware (the now obsolete
English form for such a term being, precisely, ware). To be aware of
what? To be aware of a belonging together.7' More specifically, to
guard is, first of all, to be deeply aware of a presence, to be vigilant in
that presence-and, certainly, that is what comparatist poets must be
there to do. In law's presence, in the presence-each time-of one or
another of law's many domains, comparatist poets are deeply aware of
that presence, and they remain vigilant in that presence. Yet, importantly,
to guard is not only thus to be aware of a presence, and to remain
vigilant in that presence-in what is, in fact, the presence of a presence.
Instead, to guard is also, and at the same time, to be aware of an absence
and, so, to remain vigilant in that absence-that is, in the presence of that
absence. Such is, indeed, the sense in which guarding is, as earlier suggested,
a looking at something or somebody thoroughly, comprehensively,
in
72
their own terms-in their own radical belonging together.
So, then,
such comprehensive gaze must no doubt embrace those and that in
whose presence the comparatist poet may from time to time happen to
be. But also, and somewhat more crucially, that gaze must be able to

70. That earlier meaning sometimes survives even in today's English-take, for
example, ware ("articles of merchandise or manufacture," in compound nouns such as
"hardware") which derives from the Germanic war6 (in all probability, "object of care").
71. Here, we cannot expand on this. For Heidegger, however-and in the case of
man-such would be the belonging together of man and Being. See HEIDEGGER,
IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE, supra note 66.
72. Guarding, in that sense, would be an entering into the "event of appropriation".
HEIDEGGER, supra note 66, at 36.
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reach whoever and whatever else is, in fact, absent-while, at the same
time, being present as an absence. Or, which is the same, each time
comparatist poets are present, they must be co-present together with a
present presence-but also, and at the same time; with a present absence.
And it is by the co-presence of each present presence and present
absence that both presence and absence are kept together while, on the
other hand, not being held together. Now, much more, of course, would
need to be said-but, for the time being, suffice simply to add how what
that means is that, on the one hand, comparatist- poets, being guardians
of law, are always co-present together with law in one or another of
law's many domains. On the other hand, that also means that, in each
case, comparatist poets are co-present together with that which, though
being apparent only as an absence, speaks of them as well as of law's
words, law's people, law's currencies, etc.-as a presence. And that
which, in each case, speaks as a presence of comparatist poets as well as
of law's words, law's people, law's currencies, etc.-is, of course,
language. For language speaks-not man.
So, comparatist poets, as guardians of law, are, in each case, copresent with law as well as with language-and not, as some would
have it, with law in spite of language or, else, with language in spite of
law. Comparatist poets, then, are comparatist poets in so far as they are
aware of, and remain vigilant in, such manifold co-presence. And such
co-presence, of course, is possible for comparatist poets, like all of
Heidegger's thinkers and poets, are guardians of language. As we have
seen, language is language, and language speaks. As language is language,
and language speaks; and, as comparatist poets are guardians of language
(as well as of law), comparatist poets are closer than most to that which,
in each case, is spoken by it.
B. Meditating Difference
But how, precisely, can that be? In what way are comparatist poets,
in each case, closer than most to that which is spoken by language? A
first inroad into such question is to realize that language is language,
language speaks, and comparatist poets are guardians of language. But
some further thinking will make apparent how, in each case, comparatist
poets are closer than most to that which is spoken by language for,
unlike others, comparatist poets are distant-forever distant-from that

which is dearest to most. That is, they are distantfrom home.73 Forever
distant from home, by no means do comparatist poets keep themselves,
or anyone else, or anything else, at a distance-as if, despite such
distance, some closeness were still possible yet somewhat mysteriously
(if harshly) denied. To the contrary, the point is that, forever distant
from home, comparatist poets poetically dwell in the distance.74 And it
is by poetically dwelling in the distance, and only by poetically dwelling
in the distance, that comparatist poets can tell what difference the law
makes-and so they can say it. That is, in turn, quite important-for
that is indeed where the originalityof poetic comparisons, as well as the
responsibility of the comparatist poet, may be taken to lie. The
originality of poetic comparisons is thus to be found not so much in what
might or might not make poetic comparisons distinctive-as, rather
more fundamentally, in whatever there may or may not be to them which
would be productive, that is, original. In particular, the originality of
poetic comparisons must lie in what difference the law makes which
comparatist poets can tell and then say-and, similarly, it is precisely in
the saying of what they can tell that their responsibility, too, must be
found to rest. So, then, what difference does the law make? The answer
to this question cannot be sought once and for all-for there can be no
single answer that could be evoked which would genuinely respond, that
is, correspond, to the rich variety of law's many domains (law's people,
law's words, and law's currencies). Yet, it is an important question to
ask, and it is indeed by poetically dwelling in the distance-and only by
poetically dwelling in that distance-that, in each case, comparatist
poets can properly think the experience of difference.75
Thus, in summary, poetic comparisons of law are original precisely in
that comparatist poets can tell, in each case, what difference the law
makes-a difference which, then, they are going to say. Comparatist
poets can tell what difference the law makes for-forever distant from
home-comparatist poets poetically dwell in the distance and so can
properly think the experience of difference. If that is the case, we can
now make one further step towards a fuller (albeit still incomplete)
answer to the question of comparative law-the question which asks:
what is comparative law? 76 So far, we have been able to see how, if
comparative lawyers are genuinely to contribute to the current, crucial
73.
74.
75,
76.
stepping
MARTIN

See Stramignoni, supra note 18.
On the concept of dwelling poetically, see HEIDEGGER, supra note 32, at 213-29.
See Stramignoni, supra note 18.
For Heidegger, questions such as "what is comparative law?" require a
backwards (rather than forwards) as the manner of moving forward, see
HEIDEGGER, Das Wesen der Sprache, in Unterwegs zur Sprache, in 12
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debates on the future of Western democracies and the rule of law, they
may have seriously to engage in poetic, meditating comparisons.
Comparative lawyers, that is (or at least some of them), may have to
become comparatist poets. Poetic, meditating comparisons, we have
also seen, are a clearing-but what, in particular, might that clearing
succeed to clear? A first central answer is that such a clearing may clear
the way for a rather more radical meaning of language than that which is
often held-a more radical meaning of language than language understood
as, simply, ordinary language. Instead, on the alternative meaning
proposed here, language no doubt belongs to women and men butsomewhat more fundamentally-women and men belong to language. 7
Yet a further way in which poetic, meditating comparisons would occur
as a clearing would be whenever we began to realize how poetic, meditating
comparisons would meditate difference. Meditating difference, that is,
would be another interesting way by which we could draw closer to a
freshly thought-of answer to the question of comparative law-an
answer to the question: what is comparative law?
In comparative law like elsewhere, meditating difference is, of course,
neither easy nor obvious a task. By contrast, it is a task fraught with
political, economic, social, and religious implications. So, for example,
H. E. Yntema (in 1942) understandably associated difference with
nationalism when praising comparative law for helping to realize the
goal of the international unification of law, as well as foster the principle of
solidarity. 78 More recently another commentator notes how "[d]ifferences
between legal systems have been regarded, at least from the time of
Cicero, as evils or inconveniences to overcome. A Babel of laws seems
divisive, confusing, and obstructive, and every age has its advocates for
a unified law-a common law of mankind. '79 So, no doubt the modern
association of comparative law with often prevailing universalistic
projects must have worked as a powerful deterrent against meditating
difference-so long as the general belief, largely induced by the horrors
of WWII, was that "there is... no true science of law unless it is
universal in scope and spirit. Comparative law is... one element in this new

77. Stramignoni, supra note 18.
78. Hessel E. Yntema, Comparative Research and Unification of Law, 41 MICH L.
REV. 261-68 (1942).
79. John Henry Merryman, On the Convergence (and Divergence) of the Civil Law
and the Common Law, 17 STAN. J. INT'L L. 357 (1981).

universalism so important today."8 Yet, the very real imperviousness of
meditating difference as difference must also be a reason why
comparative law studies generally ignore or play-down difference--or
why, when they do engage with it, they often fail to note how events
such as WWII,the fall of the Berlin wall and September 11, 2001, now
require us to think of difference in some entirely fresh manner.
So, then, mainstream comparative lawyers do of course take difference
as the starting point of their legal comparisons (whether they understand
difference to be functional, efficiency-related or linear-historical, is here
unimportant). However-as the interest of mainstream comparative lawyers
lies rather solidly in the uncovering of what structural similarities they
believe functional, efficiency-related, or linear-historical differences to
reveal-mainstream comparative lawyers end-up giving difference
relatively little attention.8' So, for example, Konrad Zweigert and Hein
KOtz tell us, somewhat unhelpfully, how "different legal systems" answer
certain questions "quite differently. 82 More interestingly, Saul Levmore
sets out to explain uniformity and variety in law by resorting to the
basic tenets of behavioralism-but, so long as what he really hopes to
demonstrate is uniformity and not variety, he then makes very little
effort to take the latter seriously. 83 Similarly, John Henry Merryman is
clear about the key-role that difference ought to hold in comparative
law research-when, for instance, one considers the debate on the
supposed convergence of the various legal families of the world.84
Indeed, Merryman openly admits how the convergence debate can in
fact "mislead by diverting attention from the forces of divergence"-yet,
what exactly might he understand by those particular expressions
evoking difference-remains unclear. 85
80.
81.

DAVID& BRIERLEY, supra note 19, at 16.
Thus, for example, little is said on difference, see ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra

note 19; DAVID & BRIERLEY, supra note 19; Helmut Coing, European Common Law:
Historical Foundations, in NEW PERSPECTIVES FOR A COMMON LAW OF EUROPE (Mauro

Cappelletti ed., European University Institute 1978); Ugo Mattei, Three Patternsof Law:
Taxonomy and Change in the World's Legal Systems, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 5, (1997).
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ZWEIGERT & KOTz, supra note 19, at 39.

83. Saul Levmore, Rethinking Comparative Law: Variety and Uniformity in
Ancient and Modern Tort Law, 61 TUL. L. REV. 235 (1986); Saul Levmore, Variety and

Uniformity in the Treatment of the Good-FaithPurchaser,16 J. LEGAL STUD. 43 (1987).
84. To the question: Are legal systems, and in particular, the Civil Law and the
Common Law, converging, the answer must be yes. But they are also
diverging; both processes are going on at the same time. If such thing can be
imagined, and if it would be workable, the product of the present tendency
might ultimately be one universal, but highly pluralistic, legal system.
Merryman, supra note 79, at 373.
85. id. at 375. And, he adds, "[t]he movement is toward internal diversity and
complexity, and the fact that it is going on more or less simultaneously in Western
nations demonstrates that in some important ways these legal systems are diverging." Id.
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If difference is little more than a working assumption for mainstream
comparative lawyers-something to get away from-some of the most
inquisitive writers do, by contrast, recognize the very real impact of
difference in comparisons-which, unlike the others, they firmly place
at the core of their analysis. While that approach is to be preferred if one
is eventually to engage in poetic comparisons, what exactly do such
"dissidents" comparative lawyers mean by difference is often left for the
reader to work-out. 86 So, for example, while Rodolfo Sacco recognizes
how "[1Iaws and languages are dominated by difference," and how "all
that is real is dominated by diversity," quite what might he take
difference or diversity to mean is not said.87 Similarly, Pierre Legrand is
keen to stress how "the common law mentalitj is not only different, but
is actually irreducibly different, from the civil law mentalitg as found in
Continental Europe"-so much so that "[i]t is between these legal
traditions that 'the primordial cleavage-the summa differentia-lies.88
Legrand argues that such summa differentia appears in the different nature
of legal reasoning, the significance of systematization, the character of rules,
the roles of facts, the meaning of rights and the presence of the past 89 but, again, what the nature might be of such summa differentia, of such
"irreducible differences", Legrand does not say. 90 Even Gunter
Frankenberg-for whom "re-imagining comparative legal studies"
requires the abandonment
of all forms of "legocentrism" 91 and its
"normative imagery" 92 in favor of a "rigorous experience of distance and
difference" 9 3-leaves the reader to work-out for themselves what, in the

86.

See, e.g., H. C. GUTrERIDGE, COMPARATIVE LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
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Sacco, supra note 86, at 172.
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Id. at 64-74.
See also Pierre Legrand, What "Legal Transplants"?, in ADAPTING LEGAL

CULTURES 55-70 (David Nelken & Johannes Feest eds., Hart Publishing 2001).
91. "By legocentrism I mean that law is treated as a given and a necessity, as the
natural path to ideal, rational or optimal conflict resolutions and ultimately to a social
order guaranteeing peace and harmony." Frankenberg, supra note 20, at 445.
92. Id. at 447.
93. Id. at 453.

context of the critical approach advocated by that author, "difference"
might actually be.
Unlike mainstream comparative lawyers (who simply ignore difference
by either discounting or demonizing it), dissident comparative lawyers
know exactly what they mean when they bring difference back to the
center stage of comparative analysis. However, theirs is often a notion
which we can broadly but aptly characterize as "neo-Hegelian". The
considerable range of neo-Hegelian conceptions of difference which
seem to underlie much dissident comparative law is, perhaps, a testimony of
the richness and suggestiveness of that scholarship. Furthermore, such
neo-Hegelian conceptions of difference refreshingly lead dissident
comparative lawyers to give maximum attention to ordinary language.
Now, that is all very well and good-but how are neo-Hegelian conceptions
of difference to deal with world events like the fall of the Berlin wall
and, now, September 11, 2001? The disintegration of the Eastern block and
the consequential, radical reconfiguration of the "West"-which many
feel the attack on the Twin Towers has shockingly come to symbolizeseem to warn us that the "other" no longer exists.94 Indeed, what might
be left of the meaning today so far conveyed by ordinary language-by
the like of "rights", "security", "terror", "private law", "public law",
"legal family", "history", "function", "efficiency" or "convergence"
(to mention, of course, but a few)? What, in short, might be the meaning
of ordinary language, when ordinary language is no longer capable of
relating to the other-for no longer is the other out-there to be said?
C. Difference as Difference
Poetic comparisons of law's many domains are meditating comparisons.
Meditating comparisons start from the question of comparative lawthey start by asking what the heartland of comparative law might be.
However, hardly any meaningful answer to such a question can possibly
come very much into sight if one contents oneself to stop at functions,
efficiency, and linear-history, or, for that matter, at ordinary language.
Surely, functions, efficiency, linear-history, and ordinary language can
be looked at fruitfully-provided, of course, that the comparatist poet
has an interest in them. Poetic comparisons indeed encourage one to
look at functions, efficiency, linear-history, and (better still) at ordinary
language, if one is interested in them. Yet, the point is that poetic
comparisons encourage us to do so in order to step back from them and
look at function, efficiency, linear-history, and language entirely afresh.

94.

Not, at least, the "other" with which the West had been, until now, familiar.
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Would such stepping back not be a distancing?9 5 No.96 Quite the opposite,
such stepping back would be a getting closer and closer to those and
other fundamental aspects of comparative law which happen to interest
the comparatist poet. Yet, such a nearness would be required in order to
think function, efficiency, linear-history, ordinary language, etc., entirely
afresh. For "if man is to find his way once again into the nearness of
Being he must first learn to exist in the nameless. 97 But how might that
nearness be achieved? By getting straight back to language as well as to
difference. By language, poetic comparisons understand both a pointing
and a hearing-not simply ordinary language. What, then, do they mean
by difference?
Once again, valuable insights can be derived from Heidegger's own
thinking. In a lecture given at Todtnaumberg in 1957, and entitled
(quite forbiddingly) The Onto-theo-logical Constitution of Metaphysics,
Heidegger sets out to discuss the nature of Western metaphysics
which, he notes, firmly root the difference between Being and
(human) beings on Being itself. Whether by Being Heidegger means
a god, nature, reason, man, or society-is here beside the point. The
point by contrast is that, Heidegger notes, at the origins of each new
phase of Western thinking there is this simple act of differentiation
between Being and (human) beings-through which Western
thinking will each time be able to resort to Being in order to explain
the "essence" of (human) beings.98 But have Western metaphysics,
and so Western thinking, given enough thought to difference?
Metaphysics, Heidegger explains, have been, since the Greeks, both
ontology and theology. As ontology, metaphysics think Being as the
first and most universal ground of all beings.
As theology,
metaphysics think Being as the highest ground above all beings. That
is what Heidegger calls the onto-theo-logical nature of Western
metaphysics and, indeed, of Western thinking. And that is how
Western metaphysics have been able thus to ground the difference
between Being and (human) beings on Being itself. What, however,
the onto-theo-logical nature of Western metaphysics has at the same
time been able also to conceal is, precisely, the nature of the
95. Such is the sense advocated by some dissident comparative lawyers.
Frankenberg, supra note 20.
96. On such "step back" see HEIDEGGER, supra note 66, at 49.
97. HEIDEGGER, Letter on Humanism, in BASIC WRITINGS, supra note 29.
98. On the metaphysical character of Western thinking see id.

See

fundamental difference metaphysics claim to posit-that between
Being and (human) beings. "The oblivion here to be thought is the
veiling of the difference as such, thought in terms of ATI"
(concealment); this veiling has in turn withdrawn itself from the
beginning." 99 Not only the nature of such difference has gone
systematically unnoticed-but it is on the basis of that very act of
oblivion that "metaphysics, Western thinking in its entire nature, can
be what it is."' 0 0 That is, the thinking of Being as the ground of the
difference between Being and beings. For it is only on the basis of
the oblivion of that difference as difference that all metaphysics can
turn out to be "at the bottom, and from the ground up, what grounds,
what gives account of the ground, what is called to 01account by the
ground, and finally what calls the ground to account."'
Thus we think of Being rigorously only when we think of it in its difference
with beings, and of beings in their difference with Being. The difference thus
comes specifically into view. If we try to form a representational idea of it, we
will at once be misled into conceiving of difference as a relation which our
representing has added to Being and to beings. Thus the difference 1is
02 reduced
to a distinction, something made up by our understanding (Verstand).

Now, while "this thing that is called difference, we encounter it
everywhere and always in the matter of thinking"-we are normally free
to ignore it.' 0 3 But we cannot always ignore it. And when, instead of
ignoring it, we try to think it in a more rigorous way, we soon find out how
the Being of beings means Being which is beings. The "is" here speaks transitively,
in transition. Being here becomes present in the manner of a transition to beings ...
Being shows itself as the unconcealing overwhelming. Beings as such appear in the
manner of the arrival that keeps itself concealed in unconcealedness.10 4

In the characterization proposed by Heidegger, difference as difference,
difference as such, is thus one between overwhelming and arrivalwhereby, we finally discover,
arrival,
[t]he difference of Being and beings, as the differentiation of overwhelming and105
is the perdurance (Austrag) of the two in unconcealing keeping in concealment.

99. HEIDEGGER, supra note 66, at 50. "The oblivion belongs to the difference because
the difference belongs to the oblivion. The oblivion does not happen to the difference only
afterward, in consequence of the forgetfulness of human thinking." Id. at 50-51.
100. Id. at51.
101. Id. at 58. On Being as ground, see also MARTIN HEIDEGGER, Logos Heraclitus,
Fragment B 50, in EARLY GREEK THINKING (David Farrell Krell & Frank A. Capuzzi
eds., HarperSanFrancisco 1984) (1975); MARTIN HEIDEGGER, THE PRINCIPLE OF REASON
(Reginald Lilly trans., Indiana University Press 1991) (1957).
102. HEIDEGGER, supra note 66, at 62.
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Id. at 63.
Id. at 64-65.
Id.at 65.
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The difference which Western thinking has long let fall in oblivion-the
difference as such between Being and beings-is therefore the perdurance
of overwhelming and arrival. "Within this perdurance there prevails a
clearing of what veils and closes itself off-and this its prevalence bestows
the being apart, and the being toward each other, of overwhelming and
arrival." 1 °6

It is that difference-difference

as such-that, Heidegger

suggests, should be the matter of thinking, the thinking of Being. For while
that difference is nowhere to be seen-it is indeed that difference and
nothing else that "begins the history of metaphysics, governs all of its
epochs, and yet remains everywhere concealed as perdurance, and thus
forgotten in an oblivion which even escapes itself.' ' 0 7 That difference,
poetic comparisons of law suggest, is the matter of legal thinking too-if
legal thinking and, in particular, comparative legal thinking are to make a
meaningful contribution to some of today's most urgent debates.
Indeed, poetic comparisons suggest, Western legal thinking, Western
concepts of law, represent no exception within the metaphysical tradition of
Western thinking. Law's many domains are, they too, traditionally
characterized by endless "differences" ' 08 -which, born out of a relentless if
almost obsessive need to measure-up "(human) beings" against a "Being"
of sort, the law continually, even frantically is compelled to make: nature
and legal culture, global and local, legal theory and legal practice,
adjudication and legislation, form and substance, substance and procedure,
subject and object, individual and society, man and woman, native and
immigrant, minor and adult, able and disabled, heterosexual and
homosexual, and generally human and non-human (to mention, of course,
but a few). Epistemologically, those are indeed critical differences-productive differences no less than (and often more than) they are
descriptive. Their role in legal thinking is generally recognized-and
refinements regularly proposed. Yet, such differences are seldom if ever
seriously considered by comparative lawyers. And when they are seriously
considered, 0 9 the nature of that difference remains normally un-thought.
106.
107.
108.

Id.
Id. at 68.
This seems to be indeed a central characteristic of Western thinking. See THE
ORDER OF THINGS: AN ARCHAEOLOGY OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES (Michel Foucault trans.,
Vintage Books Edition 1994).
109. There are an increasing number of diverse exceptions to the register set by
mainstream comparative law. See P. S. ATIYAH & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FORM AND
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That is why poetic comparisons of law invite us to think, or to think
again, what difference the law makes-when law makes such differences." 0
Clearly, the difference that each time the law makes lies, poetic
comparisons suggest, in the multiple distinctions which, in each case, with
feverish determination continually separate and continually regroup Being
and (human) beings. But the original difference-the difference as
difference which, in each case, lies at the origins of law's frantic
distinctions-that difference has long been forgotten, and needs to be
thought again. With Heidegger, poetic comparisons encourage us to step
back and think that difference as perdurance-and that, of course, applies
especially to comparative law. For what, for example, is function, linearhistory, efficiency or, indeed, ordinary language if not, in each case, the
infinite perdurance of the Being-functionally-equivalent, the Beinghistorical, the Being-efficient, or the Being-logos of what, in each case, is
dutifully and infinitely Being-compared?
VI. CONCLUSIONS
"Let us ...in the days ahead remain as wanderers on the way into the neighborhood
of Being."''I

A.

The "How" of ComparativeLaw

After the fall of the Berlin wall and, now, September 11, 2001, many
feel that the nature and relationship of nation states and democracy
might be set to change-when it has not already changed. If that is the
case, then surely such changes must be addressed-and with them
must be addressed those changes that primarily affect the law. Indeed,
law's many domains might have to be thought entirely afresh. That is
of course quite a project-yet, it is an urgent project to think about,
one that can no longer be sensibly postponed. Whether, in particular,
by law one refers to legal rules, legal institutions, legal procedures,
Murphy, The Oldest Social Science?: The Epistemic Properties of the Common Law
Tradition, 54 THE MODERN L. REV. 182 (1991); Sacco, Legal Formants, supra note 20;
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perspective, 18 LEGAL STUD. 146 (1998); Geoffrey Samuel, Can Gaius Really be
Compared to Darwin?,49 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 297 (2000); Legrand, supra note 90. See
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legal concepts, or, indeed, legal conceptions'l2-one can no longer be
concerned, simply, with law as it was.
Unlike what is sometimes suggested by certain writers, legal comparatists
might well be in a rather eminent position to contribute to that particular
project-which concerns political theory, law, and everyday life alike.
But, first, comparatists must think the question of comparative law
entirely afresh. What, then, is comparative law? Rather than stopping at
function, efficiency, history, or even ordinary language, legal comparatists
might wish to begin by thinking afresh the is of that question. That is,
they might begin by turning to poetic, meditating comparisons.
A radical answer to the question of comparative law shows how poetic
comparisons of law, as meditating comparisons, require us to bring
language and difference back at the center stage of comparative analysis.
By language and difference poetic comparisons mean neither ordinary
language nor difference in the sense normally employed by most
comparative law studies. Instead, by language poetic comparisons mean
both a pointing and a hearing, and by difference what they mean is
difference as such. Yet, it is precisely by putting language as a pointing
and as a hearing, and difference as such, back at the center of legal
analysis that, poetic comparisons suggest, meaningful comparisons can
still be sensibly pursued in today's changing, increasingly abstract
society. In fact, that is indeed what was earlier meant by saying that the
originality of poetic comparisons lies in that they set out to think what
difference the law makes.
One concluding remark. The question of comparative law invites of
itself to meditate comparisons. Meditating comparisons, however, is
less a what than a how-how can comparative law be thought afresh? It
might well be that it is only the perdurance of the question that, each
time, allows the question to be asked and the answer to be answered. If
that is the case, then meditating comparisons-to meditate comparisons-is
meditating thinking in the most original sense of that expression.
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